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N

ot a perfect man. Not a man without human
weaknesses. Nevertheless, he remained a proud
man with uncommon wisdom, unafraid to express
inner thoughts even if it caused him pain or humiliation. Insecure and thin-skinned, he had a need to be
heard. This serious man struck by bouts of depression,
affected American foreign policy like no other since
John Qyincy Adams.
George Frost Kennan, from Wisconsin in America's
heartland, provided a philosophical blueprint for a
nation's strategic actions and responsibilities during
the Cold War. His analysis and thoughts brought him
fame and respect within the profession of diplomats,
but his new stature did not protect him from the vicissitudes of American politics. Hailed as a prescient
observer of foreign affairs in 1947, Kennan found himself driven from government service in 1952 only to see
his reputation re-established in the 1960s, thanks to his
interpretation of the tragic U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Whether the issue was Soviet expansionism,
the relevancy of the Korean War, German unification
or the Vietnam War, George Kennan was frequently
interpreted by both friends and critics as the "heretic
in the house" of American foreign policy.
The Vietnam War and the 1960s represent a difficult and tumultuous period in our nation's history,
especially for those who participated in the making of
post-WWII American foreign policy. Kennan found
himself enmeshed in his own political policy guerillawar among his former colleagues and friends. Longtime
relationships, established during his years in govern-
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ment service, were tested severely due to the growing
unpopularity of U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia.
Thus, this article will attempt to address the following:
a)The origins of Kennan's beliefs concerning Asia in
the post-WWII period, which later became the philosophical foundation for his prescient dissent on U.S.
political and military activities in Southeast Asia.
b)Kennan's willingness to challenge American foreign policy during the Cold War.
c)Kennan's reluctant but consistent criticism ofU.S.
policies concerning Vietnam, even though it brought
the wrath of the "Wise Men'' of the U.S. foreign policy
establishment upon himself.
d) Kennan's legacy. Was his analysis of U.S. involvement in Vietnam accurate and consistent with views he
held concerning other parts of the world?
e)The lessons that Kennan believed America should
learn from its greatest foreign policy blunder.

Part I: The Origins of George F. Kennan's
Anti-Vietnam Policy Statements
George F. Kennan, author of the diplomatic and economic global strategy of containment, was an important
participant in the mid to late-1940s in the creation of
U.S. policies and philosophical principles establishing its foundational moorings during the Cold War
era. Twenty years later, Kennan used these very same
policies and principles as measuring instruments to
evaluate our involvement in Vietnam. Walter Isaacson
and Evan Thomas, who included Kennan in their critically acclaimed work, The Wise Men, provide detailed
evidence of his incalculable contribution to the development of post-World War II American foreign policy. 1
A generation later, in the 1960s, Kennan educated a
new generation with his typical clarity and profundity
concerning another foreign policy dilemma: Vietnam.
His pronouncements were not always welcomed, but
they were respected and, at times, feared by those in
power.
Kennan became a household word, at least within
foreign policy circles, when he sent his famous
(approximately 8,000 words) 'long telegram' to U.S.
State Department in 1946. The general public, including the academic world, became aware of the quiet but

serious diplomat from Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, in July 1947. It was then
that they read in Foreign Affairs journal an article called, "The Sources of
Soviet Conduct," signed "X." The
article was considered monumental
and its author, though a mystery at
first, to be a first-rate interpreter of
Soviet intentions in the post-WWII
era. This celebrated work, and his past
performance as a diplomat, primarily
in Germany and Russia, landed him
the position of Director of the Policy
Planning Staff(PPS) within the U.S.
State Department.
From 1948 to 1950 the primary
function of the PPS was to develop
rational and sound recommendations,
concerning operational principles that
represented the strategic thrusts of
American activities Europe. The staff
worked out three principles, in relation to the Marshall Plan, that were
swiftly implemented for Europe's
economic recovery:
a)Europeans should themselves
ask the U.S. for assistance.
b)All European states, including
the Soviet Union, should be eligible
for aid.
c)The decisive emphasis of the
program should be on the rehabilitation of the German economy. 2
Kennan, according to Richard
Russell, who teaches American
national security policy at U-C
Berkeley, was intensely aware of the
need for the American government
to conduct its foreign policy from a
set of principles, though he did not
necessarily articulate these policy
principles in his own work, except in
the implementation of the Marshall
Plan and the policy of containment.3
Yet it was this absolute belief in such
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principles in the facilitation of U.S.
foreign policy in a post-WWII world
that were the intellectual origins from
which Kennan's anti-Vietnam War
sentiments arose.
In 1950, Kennan's principles were
sorely tested by the invasion of South
Korea from the North. Initially, he
supported a limited war in Korea.
He believed that the attack gave U.S.
military planners an opportunity to
evaluate the Soviet Union as a hostile force in international relations.
America's involvement in Korea was
important because the future security and stability of Japan, within our
containment strategy aimed at the
Soviet Union in Northeast Asia, was
at stake. 4
Also, a forceful response was necessary to protect America's commitment
to stand by its allies, no matter how
dubious the importance to our overall national security.5 Kennan believed
that America's involvement extended
only to restoring the status quo upon
the Korean peninsula. He "saw in
the North Korean attack adequate
reason for us to undertake military
operations for this limited purpose.
(He) did not see in it justification for
involving ourselves in another world
war." 6
In 1967, Professor Kennan gave
a talk at the Charles Warren Center
at Harvard University concerning
the lack of a "conceptual element
in recent American foreign policy."7
Though this lecture focused upon
U.S. policies concerning Vietnam,
Kennan asserted that after World
War II there were only four areas in
the world where conflict represented
a threat to U.S. security, due to their
industrial potential to produce the

"sinews of modern war."The four areas mentioned were
Great Britain, Germany, Soviet Union and Japan. He
emphasized that these were the areas that were crucial
and vital to U.S. security, strongly implying that Vietnam did not measure up to this criterion. 8
Most foreign policy analysts, including Kennan,
agreed that there were no developing industrial powers
on the Asian mainland. Thus, there was no present, or
near-future threat to America. Kennan commented,
"China did not figure. There was no place on the
mainland of Asia where industrial strength could be
developed on a scale large enough to do us significant
harm."9
In October 1950, Kennan shocked the sensibilities
of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, with an analysis of
the Korean situation that was perceived by Acheson as
"flatly unrealistic and irrelevant to the crisis at hand."10
Kennan bluntly blamed the U.S. government for its
indifference to the balance of power in Asia before the
Korean WarY He noted that Korea, due to its geographical location, was situated between two major
powers, Japan and the Soviet Union. Since Japan was
in the process of post-war reconstruction, it only made
sense that Korea would eventually be absorbed into the
Soviet sphere for the short-term:
A period of Russian domination (of Korea) while
undesirable, is preferable to continued U.S. involvement in that unhappy area, as long as the means
chosen to assert Soviet influence are not, as was
the case with those resorted to in June (1950),
ones calculated to throw panic and terror into
other Asian peoples and thus to achieve for the
Kremlin important successes going far beyond the
Korean area.U
Needless to say, Secretary Acheson was not happy
with Kennan's unvarnished assessment of Korea. The
U.S. had already committed itself to a war ten thousand
miles away. Kennan, though respected for his keen analytical skills concerning U.S. foreign policy, had a habit
of giving his analysis outside the vacuum of American
politics. He didn't appreciate the forces of American
domestic politics, and their attending realities. Kennan
was certain the security of Japan and Taiwan might
inadvertently be jeopardized due to the Korean con-
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flict. 13 He believed that the rebuilding of] apan remained
America's top priority in East Asia, even if that meant
the abandonment of U.S. responsibilities in Korea.
Thus, from a security standpoint, Kennan saw no
national interests for the U.S. in the potential loss
of Korea to either the Soviet or Chinese sphere of
influence in Asia. His view of Korea did not change
during the early months of the war. Kennan's geopolitical interpretations landed him in hot water with the
embattled Dean Acheson. However, Kennan refused to
be intimidated by the domestic politics ofMcCarthyism
and right-wing reactionaries. He believed wars, or intervention by force, should be based upon vital national
interests and not by petty political expediencies.Though
perhaps nai:ve, his focused and withering candor in all
matters gave him a measure of credibility even among
those who vehemently disagreed with him.
Kennan maintained, though Acheson had frowned
upon his Korean disengagement argument, that Japan's
redevelopment represented the real objective in creating a counter-weight to possible Soviet expansionism
in northeast Asia. Korea was simply irrelevant to our
containment policies in the region because it lacked
the industrial capacity to be a real force against, or
an enhancement of, Soviet activities. Limited U.S.
resources, according to Kennan, were needed for nations
such as Japan and Taiwan that represented more important economic and military allies within our overall East
Asia strategy to contain Soviet adventurism. Acheson,
later on, gave damning praise to Kennan's observations
about the relevance of Japan and Korea to America's
overall Asian strategy when he noted that it was "typical
of (their) gifted author, beautifully expressed, sometimes contradictory, in which were mingled flashes of
prophetic insight and suggestions ... of total impractically."14
Yet, despite their policy disagreements concerning
Asia, in May 1951 Secretary Acheson chose Kennan to
contact Jacob Malik, Soviet Ambassador to the UN, to
begin peace talks concerning Korea. Though Malik saw
Kennan as a 'hawk' and anti-Soviet, he also recognized
Kennan as an expert on Russia who had influence within
the Truman Administration. In the following month,
the Soviets indicated that they were receptive to peace

57

sB

negotiations. Unfortunately, it would
take until1953 to enact a cease-fire on
the peninsula. 15
By January 1951, the Korean War
was a political lightning rod within
American society. Early support for
the war had diminished significantly.
A majority of the public wanted U.S.
involvement in Korea to end as soon
as possible. Many critics ofTruman's
policies felt it was a waste of American lives and resources. On the other
hand, right-wing militarists, such
as General MacArthur, saw it as an
opportunity to eradicate communism
from East Asia. This view frightened
Kennan. In August 1950, Kennan
warned that military activities north
of the 38'h parallel might result in the
direct involvement of the Chinese
and/or Russians. 16
The one influential voice from
the war-expansionists that was heard
within the political melee in Washington, D.C. was that of General
MacArthur. The General vehemently
opposed Truman's policies and, in lateMarch 1951, his opposition became
public knowledge. MacArthur had
written House Republican minority
leader, Joseph Martin, agreeing with
Martin's opinion concerning the use
of Chiang Kai-shek's troops from Formosa against Communist China on
the mainland. 17 MacArthur supported
a wider war on the mainland of China
that included the Korean peninsula.
A few days earlier, before his letter to
Congressman Martin became public
knowledge, the General had snubbed
the Chinese forces, and had under-cut
Truman's attempt for a cease-fire, by
suggesting that China's military forces
were close to being defeated. If only
the U.S. government would remove

the restrictions forced upon his troops, he argued, victory was achievable in the near future. 18 He ended his
letter to Congressman Martin with his famous dictum,
"There is no substitute forvictory." 19 In early April1951,
after conferring with his top advisers including Generals George Marshall and Omar Bradley, President
Truman fired MacArthur for gross insubordination
and replaced him with General Matthew Ridgeway.
Kennan believed that Truman's controversial decision
to be wise and courageous. He pointed out that to have
foreign policy driven by military considerations alone
was dangerous. In fact, Kennan saw disaster awaiting
the United States in Korea (and Asia generally) had
structural governmental discipline not been re-established in Truman's administration. 20
Kennan believed two lessons were evident from the
near-fiasco of the Korean War. First, that war must
be subordinate to political objectives. Secondly, that
secret, discreet and informal diplomacy can be great
aids to the public and formal processes of diplomacy
in the global arena. 21 Almost fifteen years later, Kennan
would be advising a new generation of political leaders
that these lessons from the Korean War continued to
be valid with regards to our involvement in Vietnam.
The Korean War was a prelude to Kennan's philosophical dissent concerning the tragic struggle in Vietnam.
For him, U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia was even
more dubious and irrelevant than our involvement in
Northeast Asia. 22

Part II: George F. Kennan's Thinking and
Writing In The 1950s and Early 1g6os
During the 1950s and the early 1960s, George F. Kennan
sought a "peace" in his personal and professional lives.
He had witnessed his containment policy become
militarized with the creation ofNSC-68 (April1950)
by Paul Nitze, Kennan's replacement as Director of the
PPS, and overseen by Secretary of State Dean Acheson.
This document was a further extension ofNSC-48, created in 1949, which envisioned Southeast Asia as an
important source of raw materials and trade. America's
failure in Vietnam began with this national security
memorandum. 23 Kennan sensed that his opinions and
observations concerning the direction of Cold War policies, including the on-going Korean War, were having
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less and less impact within the U.S. government. His
growing disagreements with Secretary Acheson became
increasingly intense and problematic. His prior relationship with General George Marshall, Truman's Secretary
of State from 1947 to 1948, had been one of creativity
and mutual respect. Those days he discovered, were
gone forever.
In retrospect, Acheson and Kennan simply did not
have the intellectual or personal chemistry needed to
produce a cohesive foreign policy that was acceptable
to both parties. The political environment in America
became increasingly narrower in terms of foreign policy
dialogue as the Cold War progressed.
By 1950, the nation's political scene had become
more rigid and intolerant. Kennan's rational and realist approach toward Soviet/Communist expansionism,
was seen as irrelevant and impractical. Senator Joseph
McCarthy began his nationwide crusade to destroy
voices ofliberal dissent in America.
He desired to escape the new harshness and venom
of the nation's politics in Washington, D.C., so he spent
most of the next two years (1950-1952), at the Institute
of Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. Later on,
in his Pulitzer Prize winning memoirs published in 1967,
Kennan expressed his exasperation with the Cold War
climate that stifled any ideas outside the new militarism
that dominated U.S. politics, including foreign policy.
Kennan, for example, strongly opposed the creation of
NATO, the re-armament of Germany, the development of the hydrogen bomb, admission of China to
the United Nations, and the accelerated de-Nazification
in Germany. He supported the uniting of (a neutral)
Germany and pulling troops out ofEurope. 24
Secretary of State Dean Acheson's cool reception of
Kennan's ideas accelerated the latter's departure from
the State Department. Kennan writes, "I felt like a court
jester, expected to enliven discussion, privileged to say
shocking things, valued as an intellectual gadfly on the
hides of slower colleagues, but not to be taken fully seriously."25 Kennan, in 1950, found himself in the world of
Washington politics, suddenly on the outside looking
in. This irrefutable reality disturbed him greatly, but he
bore this frustration with his dignity intact.
Leonard Bushkoff, reviewing Kennan's memoirs in
1967 for 1he Detroit News wrote, "Kennan's goal since
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1950 has been nothing less than an
attempt to change the basic nature and
outlook of American foreign policy. "26
He also pointed out that "Kennan was
aloof, distant, reserved, often arrogant,
and largely contentious, was actually
a sensitive man, but thin-skinned in
the extreme." 27 Kennan, according
to the reviewer was, "his own worst
enemy, a man whose inability to deal
with others prevented his ideas from
receiving much of a hearing."28 Perhaps. Putting Keenan's personality
traits aside, it is still hard to see the
Washington political establishment,
in 1950, giving him an opportunity to
explain his ideas as a new foundation
for the post-war era.
In 1961, Professor Kennan was
appointed U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia by President John F. Kennedy.
Observers saw this nomination as part
of a Kennan diplomatic comeback. He
had resigned as the U.S. ambassador
to the Soviet Union in 1952, shortly
after being appointed, due to intemperate remarks to a reporter during
an interview in Berlin. Kennan said
that living and diplomatic conditions
in Russia were worse than those that
existed in Nazi Germany. This did
not endear him to the Soviet leader
Joseph Stalin, who had hardened his
position toward the United States.
The Soviet government-sponsored
newspaper Pravda called Kennan,
"a war monger and a potential spy." 29
The Soviet government labeled him
an "enemy of the Soviet Union," after
his careless remarks became public. 30
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower did not re-appoint Kennan
to another ambassadorial post after
the Soviet debacleY In July 1953, he
resigned from the Foreign Service

after 27 years. Thus began his academic odyssey: Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton University, Oxford
University, and BBC Reith Lecturer. 32
The prestigious Reith Lectures, given in Great
Britain, again, provided Kennan an opportunity to
express his thoughts on the changing nature of the
Cold War, particularly concerning Germany. Qyietly
and succinctly, Kennan once again showed his philosophical contrariness on the topic ofU.S. foreign policy.
Walter Lippman wrote that his ideas were, again, seen
as cogent, lucid and controversial:

It was at the beginning of this reappraisal that
Mr. Kennan spoke out. He spoke gently and
quietly, as it is in his nature to do. But because
nobody in authority, not (John Foster) Dulles,
not Dr. (Konrad) Adenauer, not (British Prime
Minister) Macmillan, had anything at all to say
on the political implications of the great disclosures
about the balance of power, Mr. Keenan's words
have resounded and reverberated throughout the
world.
But while this explains why his lectures attracted
so much attention when they did, there is still
the question of why they have attracted so much
support. My own view is that the Western allies
had come to a dead end on the road which they
had been following in the post-war years. The
road which Mr. Kennan pointed out is the only
alternative which some promise of leading to the
reunification of Germany and to the national independence of the East European states. 33
The 1950s, for the most part, represented the "wilderness years" for George F. Kennan. He became an
outsider within the foreign policy establishment.
Kennan continued to write and lecture about U.S.
foreign policy, but he no longer had an official status
within the U.S. government.
In 1961, President Kennedy brought 'Mr. X' in
from the cold. Unfortunately, Kennan's experience in
Yugoslavia was something of a disappointment for him.
He tendered his resignation in the summer of 1963, to
President Kennedy.
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Part III: George F. Kennan, Vietnam and the
Foreign Policy Elite
Unlike his experience in the late-1940s, Kennan was
not hailed as a visionary in the 1960s, though he was
celebrated for creating a geo-political containment
strategy that became the heart of U.S. foreign policy
for nearly fifty years. Despite this, several members of
the "Wise Men" were not amused by his public criticisms that were directed at the policies and solutions
they had presented to President Johnson. In short,
among the men who helped form U.S. foreign policy
after World War II, there developed a division among
the diplomatic elite. Kennan became an outsider from
within. 34 1his was typical of a man whom many describe
as the most cerebral of America's policymakers in the
20'h century.
America's new leaders reacted aggressively to George
F. Kennan's analysis and observations in the 1960s. His
clear and hard observations were not appreciated by the
driving forces in the U.S. foreign policy establishment:
the President, U.S. State Department, and, of course,
the Pentagon. Though highly respected amongst the
brethren, Kennan was seen and treated as a heretic, a
gadfly and a disappointment by one-time peers. 35 1he
civil war that was playing itself out in the rice paddies of
Vietnam was mirrored in the halls of power in America.
In hindsight, it's clear that the foreign policy establishment was in the process of self-immolation. By the time
the Vietnam War ended in 1975, the careers, futures and
reputations of the "Wise Men," the foreign policy elite,
and Johnson's Administration were in tatters. 36 Historians and political scientists are still combing through
the charred rubble of U.S. policy toward Vietnam and
Southeast Asia of this period. The Vietnam War was
fought with aggressive "manifest destiny" fervor, yet
the tides of history and anti-colonialism could not be
overcome.
History, unquestionably, has enhanced George F.
Kennan's reputation in relation to his prescient interpretations and predictions of the domestic and foreign
ramifications for America, due to the Vietnam War.
Yet, ironically, he was never fully embraced by the
anti-war movement for his contribution toward altering the thinking of many Americans. His prestige and
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command ofU.S. foreign policy gave
dovish politicians cover with constituents who supported the war. He gave
an intellectual gravitas to the anti-war
movement that was perceived in some
quarters as being un-American, perhaps even a communist-inspired plot
to undermine America.
Kennan provided a credible foundation for creating a new dialogue on
Vietnam. The man who inspired the
containment doctrine in the late1940s could not, and would not,
have his patriotism questioned by
the powers that be. The anti-Vietnam factions were provided with an
intellectual spine to stand up to the
increasingly unsound policies of the
Johnson Administration. 37
Kennan's dislike of U.S. involvement in Vietnam had its intellectual
roots in the late 1940s. They were
not developed in the volatile 1960s,
like those of most critics who protested America's greatest foreign
policy blunder. Kennan writes in his
memoirs that the United States was
greatly overextended in the Far East.
He saw Japan and the Philippines as
the cornerstones of a Pacific security
arrangement. As far as having permanent land bases on mainland
Asia to ensure U.S. national security,
Kennan stated clearly and without
ambiguity:
There was, as will be seen, no
hint in this exposition (his
analysis of our military presence in Asia) of a view that we
require for the assurance of our
national security any special
military position anywhere on
the mainland of Asia. 38

Although Southeast Asia was not his area of expertise as an American foreign-service officer, Kennan
continually argued that due to the lack of industrial
development within the region, the countries within
this region were not a crucial component to America's
containment of the Soviet Union. In 1965, Kennan
stated that the "communization'' of the region, in and
of itself, did not represent a defeat for the U.S. from a
geo-political standpoint:
Our present involvement in Vietnam is a classic
example of the sort of situation we ought to avoid
if we do not wish to provoke in Moscow precisely
those reactions that are most adverse to our interests
... Not to worry so about these remote countries
scattered across the southern crescent (Southeast
Asia), to let them go their own way, not to regard
their fate as our exclusive responsibility, to wait
for them to come to us rather than our fussing
continually over them. 39
Kennan, in 1964 at Tokyo University, represented
Asia in general as a challenge for our policymakers.
Though most of the American people did not see
themselves as imperialistic or as foreign oppressors at
this time, Kennan believed that the U.S. did not want to
appear as if they were simply handing over the region to
the Chinese Communists. Perhaps America could find
a middle ground in this region of the world. Kennan
believed that the U.S. had something to contribute:
Disagree as one may with specific American policies, America's positive contribution in the world
has not be so small, nor is it so meaningless potentially for the future, that the world will really wish
to dispense with it entirely. This being the case, the
new and unaccustomed involvement of the United
States people in world affairs will continue in one
way or another. 40
Yet many observers saw a condescending cultural
"Manifest Destiny" at the heart of America's intentions for these agriculturally-based and technologically
backward nations. America presented itself as a great
example of a multi-cultural democracy. The U.S., being
an ethnically, racially and religiously assimilated nation,
insisted that Asia, with our guidance, achieve a similar
level of harmony. 41 In short, the U.S., convinced of its
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own achievements and infallibility, was attempting to
create its own image in this part of the world.
This "American Exceptionalism" had become
increasingly important in relation to Vietnam, because
if America could transform Vietnam into a version of
itself, then Russia and China's future influence would
be diminished greatly. Vietnam could become a shining
light of democratic western capitalism and values, a de
facto West Berlin, in Southeast Asia. That objective was
one of the foundational arguments that were continually debated within the foreign policy establishment.
Southeast Asia's cheap resources were seen as necessary
for Japan, in its attempt to develop a growth-oriented
post-war economy. The Japanese were given a substantial
role by the U.S. in the containment of the Soviet Union
in northeast Asia. Without American intervention, it
was determined that Vietnam would be dominated
by Russia or China. Vietnamese nationalism, though
a recognized factor, relentlessly promoted by North
Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, was interpreted
by U.S. foreign policy analysts as being a secondary
consideration when compared to the perceived global
aims of the Soviet Union, or even China's pursuit of
regional hegemony.
Kennan continually questioned the importance of
Vietnam to our overall national security objectives in
Asia. Committing American resources toward the prevention of the expansion of communism, in a part of
the world that had no real importance to our national
security appeared to be pure folly. It was, according to
Kennan, an improper application of the "containment
doctrine."What was occurring in Vietnam in the 1960s
was, in his mind, a possible repeat performance and
justification for the Chinese to get involved as they
did in Korea. 42
Robert McNamara, one of the primary architects
of the Vietnam War, wrote in his belated memoir, In
Retrospect (1995), that U.S. involvement in Southeast
Asia was based upon Kennan's containment strategy.
Yet, McNamara and other White House officials had
ignored Kennan's penetrating testimony at the Fulbright Senate hearings in 1966, about the significance
of China's failure of gaining controlling influence in
Indonesia. Also, the potency of the domino theory,
indirectly addressed by Kennan during his testimony,

had obsessed the foreign policy elite
within Southeast Asia. Sadly,McNamara admits that Kennan's larger
point went unnoticed. 43
Kennan began his public criticisms
ofU.S. policy in Asia as early as 1959.
He provided testimony before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on his views concerning Asia
and U.S. foreign policy in a volatile
and evolving post-colonial world.
Admittedly, Kennan noted that Asia
was not his area of expertise, but the
events in the region concerned him
as an American citizen and as a veteran observer of international affairs,
"This is an area about which I have
said very little publicly, because I have
not served there, and I have visited
the area only briefly. I can only say
now that, like many other Americans,
I look with a certain uneasy feeling
at our situation out there." 44 At this
point, Kennan was concerned with
the situation between China and
Formosa. U.S. involvement in Vietnam was miniscule in terms of troops
and national commitment. Kennan,
however, also warned the senators
that "the greatest danger, perhaps, as
Americans, is to fail to realize that
this is always a changing world ..... the
task of statesmanship is to be on top
of this process." 45
In 1961, Kennan wrote an article
entitled, "The American Student and
Foreign Affairs," that pointed out
what was wrong with the education
of our students who desired a career
in the field of international affairs.
Kennan indicated three areas that
students needed to master before
entering the diplomatic ranks: Professional preparation, factual knowledge
and understanding different cultures.
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He wrote in an article, "Geography,
world history, religion and culture
meet this need for factual knowledge
about the world around us." 46 The
article had an eerie prescient quality to it. It would be these very same
characteristics that critics pointed to
when things began to go wrong in
Vietnam. Later, MeN amara again
asserted that these fundamental elements of knowledge were missing
within the decision-making structure
concerning Vietnam. 47
In 1963, Kennan wrote a brief
analytical piece for Look Magazine
called, "Our Foreign Policy is Paralyzed." He criticized how America
gave out foreign aid to nations claiming a need of such funding. Kennan
was especially suspicious of those
who were ideologically blackmailing
us during the Cold War. He stated
with his typical clarity, "I personally
am skeptical about foreign aid, especially when it is given as a condition
of not going Communist. We should
help those who say, 'we are going
to survive whether you help us or
not'- like Finland. When a country
says, 'If you don't help us, we will go
under,' we should get off the trolley."48
It is interesting to note that President
Kennedy, when interviewed in early
September 1963, by CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite, stated that
the South Vietnamese government
needed to make a greater effort for
popular support. Without popular
support, he doubted the war could
be won. However, he was not ready
to withdraw U.S. support. In short, the
President would continue to supply
arms and logistics to Vietnam, despite
his public reservations about the situation.49

An interesting item must be noted. Kennan was a
guest on the television show, Meet 7he Press, in August
1963, where he was asked not a single question about
Vietnam. Despite a growing concern in the White
House, the issue of Vietnam was not, yet, on the radarscreen of the mainstream media. Four years later, on
the same show, Kennan would speak on this issue of
Vietnam quite extensively. 50
President Kennedy's assassination in November 1963
had a deep effect upon Kennan. He sensed that America
had lost a leader of great potential who was still in the
stage of development and growth. The question, asked
later on, about whether the U.S. would have sent combat
troops into Vietnam was not addressed in an interview
shortly after the President's death. Yet the implication
that JFK was capable of taking the U.S. in a new and
different direction was quite clear in his comments to
the Zurich newspaper, Tagesanzeiger, interview published 30 November 1963, Kennan stated:
By the time the hand of the assassin reached him,
he was only approaching the peak of his powers. He
had grown steadily in stature, under the discipline
of his office ... His conduct of American foreign
relations would, I am sure, have led to major results,
of decisive value to a world weary of passion, war
and insecurityY
In the spring of 1964, Kennan visited the International House in Tokyo. The issue of Vietnam and the
upcoming 1964 presidential election were addressed
during his presentation. He saw the U.S. reaching
a point of critical mass in terms of its involvement
in Vietnam. Kennan did not want to predict which
direction American policy was heading, or might be
heading, in terms of Vietnam, but the situation was
"highly unstable,'' and "at some point either (we) have to
get out or to go in in a manner which will also produce
great changes there."52
In the fall, a month before the presidential election,
Kennan publicly defended Johnson's benign Vietnam
policy. He "deplored demands (by Goldwater) for socalled 'victory','' and for the administration to spell out
publicly exactly what it intended to do (in Vietnam) _53
Kennan told the audience oflawyers and legal representatives, representing the California State Bar, that the
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U.S., "By and large, has not done too badly. Our adversary (Communism) has not disappeared from the face
of the globe. But neither has he gained his objectives."54
He also commented that the situation in Vietnam was a
delicate one for the U.S. government. Extreme care must
be recognized and utilized to maintain stability.55
LBJ campaigned as a rational man of peace. In an
effort to win the presidency in his own right, he stated
that he would not send American boys ten thousand
miles away to do what Vietnamese should being doing
for themselves. He also portrayed his opponent, Republican Barry Goldwater, as a dangerous war-monger. 56 In
a tragic twist of fate, Johnson, though a self-proclaimed
peace candidate, was preparing for war. He made the
commitment of sending U.S. combat troops to Vietnam
in July 1965. How he reached that decision remains controversial. Nevertheless, he must bear the responsibility
for the eventual debacle that nearly caused a second civil
war in America. 57
In February 1965, The New York Times published an
article concerning a speech, "The United States and the
Communist Giants," given by George Kennan at Princeton University. Kennan told the audience that U.S.
involvement in Vietnam could very well provoke the
kind of reaction from Moscow that was not in our best
interest. Because of our strategic geo-political errors,
the U.S. finds itself in a dangerous and rigid situation.
Kennan stated, with typical directness, that the U.S.
"not to worry so much about these remote countries
scattered across the southern crescent, to let them go
their own way, not to regard their fate as our exclusive
responsibility. To wait for them to come to us rather
than our fussing continually over them."58
The following month, Kennan gave testimony before
the House Sub-committee on the Far East and the
Pacific concerning the rift between the Soviet Union
and China. Both countries, according to Kennan, were
competing for the leadership of the communist world.
Though this titanic struggle was important, Kennan
believed that the U.S. should seek a self-interested
advantage in achieving global peace. However, it is
important to note that Kennan recommended that the
U.S. take no sides in this quarrel. It was important that
the U.S. understand the varied and volatile differences
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between China and the Soviet Union,
but nevertheless remaining outside
the hostilities existing between these
two major powers.59 George Kennan
also warned of a possible RussiaChina alliance due to the Vietnam
War. The possibility of bombing
China could quite possibly bring
Russia into the equation. This was an
unacceptable development. Several
senators silently agreed, but they felt
they had to be publicly supportive of
Johnson's policies. 60
David Halberstam, in an interview in 1997, stated that Congress
was scared of "losing Vietnam." The
ghost of China's communist takeover
in 1949 had haunted the Democratic
Party during the 1950s. Republicans,
such as Richard Nixon and Joseph
McCarthy, during the 1952 presidential campaign reminded voters
that it was the Democrats who had
"lost" China. 61
At the end ofl965, Kennan publicly spoke out, in the Miami Herald,
for the first time concerning the
developing anti-Vietnam intervention movement. The intentions of
this growing faction remained a
mystery to the elderly statesman.
Kennan said, "the young Americans
who march around with Viet Cong
flags, or profess to favor a Viet Cong
victory, are choosing a very strange
way to demonstrate an attachment
to the cause of either independence
or freedom, if this is indeed what they
are interested in." 62 This was not the
last time that Kennan questioned the
intentions of the anti -war movement.
Perhaps it was a generational thing,
but there is no doubt that the two
principles never saw their respective
roles in the same light.

Kennan pointed out that democracy was not the
norm throughout the world. Democracy is a Western
idea. Hence, the U.S. confronted a multitude of abuses
concerning self-government throughout the world,
particularly in non-Western regions. Due to this reality, Kennan was convinced that the U.S. could not
possibly adjudicate militarily or politically all the cases
ofinjustice. Kennan stated matter-of-factly that, "some
of them (abuses) are closer to home than Vietnam." 63 It
was not the last time that Professor Kennan expressed
concern that America's obsession to convert the world
to democracy, especially since the U.S. was struggling
in providing these same fundamental rights to many
of its own citizens.
As the Vietnam War began to heat up and U.S.
involvement increased incrementally, Kennan's opinions about Vietnam and Asia also showed an equal
growth of intensity. In early 1966, Kennan gave the
Goodspeed Lecture at Denison University. He provided
an in-depth analysis about Asia and the continuing
struggle between China and Russia for hegemony in
the communist world. According to Kennan, China's
leaders were arrogant and bitter. They intended to
humiliate the United States globally. Kennan strongly
implied that our relationship with them was bound to
be difficult diplomatically. 64
In terms of Asia, Kennan saw the importance of
the region, particularly Southeast Asia, as being not
nearly as important as Western Europe after World
War II. There were two factors concerning Asia that
he addressed:
l)The countries of Southeast Asia, that is ....while
certainly important in many ways, is not a major industrial area. These countries are not in the same category
as Japan, Korea or Western Germany.
2)The Chinese-Russian conflict has had the effect
of practically forcing every other communist regime in
the world to think for itself, to make its own decisions,
and to develop certain elements of independence in its
own policy. 65
Kennan noted that North Vietnam made a concerted
effort to remain in China's good graces during its war
against the United States, "This is true of the North
Vietnamese even now, to some extent; and it would
be much more true of them if the logic of the war in
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Vietnam did not force them to keep close to Peking and
to assure themselves of Chinese favor, for the event that
they should, at any time, require Chinese intervention
to save their position."66
In March 1966, Denison University's campus newspaper, Campus Dialogue, published an interview given
by Kennan during his visit to the school. He indirectly
attacked U.S. policy that justified our intervention in
Vietnam. He strongly felt that it was impossible for
America to impose its system of government on a ThirdWorld country. Kennan commented, "Our institutions,
our political ideas and our principles are the product of
a long and specific historical experience." 67 If Kennan
believed our system was not replicable in Southeast
Asia in 1966, then it should not surprise analysts of
this period that he was dead-set against our methodology in attempting to implement such fallacious
policymaking:
This is a great problem. What good does it do to
plunge these people into suffering, bloodshed and
civilian losses, simply in order to try to bring some
sort of development program to them? If that is
the cost of it- the question is whether it is worth
the price you pay. 68
In April 1966, Kennan appeared before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by U.S. Senator
William J. Fulbright. The Fulbright Hearings were an
attempt by the senator to provide a forum for those
questioning our actions in Vietnam. It was a debate
that probably should have been held in August 1964,
when the Gulf ofTonkin Resolution was passed almost
unanimously (House: 416-0; Senate: 88-2), without a
congressional debate of any substance, or depth of
understanding. (Note: Only U.S. Senators Wayne
Morse and Ernest Groening voted against the Gulf
ofTonkin Resolution) Kennan, in his testimony, spoke
with typical candor and eloquence on what he believed
were the major structural weaknesses of U.S. policy in
Vietnam:
1)Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam, was not a
major priority for the U.S. in its global struggle against
Communism. Vietnam was not a major industrial-military threat to U.S. vital interests.
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2)Kennan called U.S. military
intervention, in Vietnam, as being
"unfortunate." He believed that the
U.S., given the same circumstances,
would not intervene if given the same
choice again.
3)Kennan warned, once again, that
the defeat of North Vietnam's ability to wage war in South Vietnam
would probably trigger another Chinese intervention-An intervention
that could prove disastrous for the
U.S., due to the hostile terrain that
American forces would find themselves fighting in. (The Korean War
analogy was not lost upon members
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)69
Kennan's testimony gave credibility to those academic, congressional
and social critics who questioned
President Johnson's war policies.
Kennan was widely respected for
his war analysis of global events.
Now, in 1966, the "Wise Men"'who
designed post-war foreign policy now
on opposing sides. It was America's
most divisive war since the American
Civil War, a hundred years earlier. Old
colleagues, like Dean Acheson, Averill
Harriman, Robert Lovett and Charles
Bohlen, were now opponents from a
policy standpoint. Kennan knew and
respected them all, but he would not
let old friendships alter his opinions.
In Kennan's opinion, the war was
fundamentally wrong for America. It
was a waste of resources badly needed
for more important U.S. priorities at
home and abroad.
Kennan continued his assault on
the misguided American policies
concerning Vietnam. In September
1966, he criticized, in The New York
Times, what he saw as a hardening of

U.S. war policies. In short, the window of debate was
closing.This process had purposely diminished a needed
dialogue about U.S. involvement in Vietnam. This
development disturbed Kennan greatly. He believed
that there existed a real possibility that a larger and
more dangerous war might develop in Southeast Asia.
Kennan also believed it was time for increased public
discussion domestically, and internationally-perhaps
in the U.N. General Assembly. He stated that world
opinion was turning against us, the strategic bombing
did not appear to be effective, and the China factor
remained erratic and unpredictable. All of these factors, according to Kennan's estimation, could lead to
a wider war. 70
In early 1967, Arkansas U.S. Senator William J.
Fulbright decided that a wider inquiry was needed to
discuss the Vietnam War. These hearings, in February,
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, were a
follow-up of those held in April1966. Kennan again
testified for several hours about U.S. policy in Southeast
Asia. 71 He pointed out that the war in Vietnam was a
civil war, and not a war ofliberation controlled by China
or the Soviet Union. 72
The following month, at Harvard University, Kennan
was seen pounding away at U.S. policy toward Vietnam.
An audience of seven hundred heard him criticize the
American decision-making process, which was, according to Kennan, based upon "sentiment and emotions
than on concept of an overall foreign policy."73 He also
stated that if the U.S. government had truly evaluated
Vietnam based upon merit alone, then the whole sad
debacle might have been avoided altogether. Unfortunately, it was wounded pride, illusions of our own
power, a sense what is moral and legal for global relations among all nations and a sentimental approach to
our standing in Asia that was the foundation of our folly
in Southeast Asia. Finally, the militaristic attitude of our
foreign policy, mixed with an ignorance of the evolution
of global communism kept us in the quagmire. 74
Kennan made another appearance on Meet the Press
in November 1967. Unlike the previous appearance,
Kennan was indeed asked about China and Vietnam
by the panelists. Elie Abel, affiliated with NBC News,
asked Kennan about the principle of containment being
applied to Vietnam incorrectly. Kennan replied:
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"That is absolutely correct. I would not consider the
concept of containment, which I put forward and with
which I was connected 20 years ago, as applicable to
support our present effort in Vietnam." 75
Max Frankel, a reporter with 7he New York Times,
asked Kennan about the possible danger of China
dominating non-communist Asian nations if a large
U.S. military presence was removed. Kennan replied:
I think that requires a great deal of critical
examination and re-examination at every stage
as international developments proceed .... .I do
believe there are other ways in which this conflict
could be brought to an end, and which would not
have the unsettling effect to which you have drawn
attention. 76
As 1968 drew to a close, there were 500,000 troops
in Vietnam, and approximately 30,000 dead U.S. soldiers. There were calls from anti-war Democrats that
someone should challenge LBJ for the Democratic
nomination for the 1968 presidential election. Robert
Kennedy, George McGovern and Frank Church refused
to attempt to unseat a sitting president. In December,
one man did step forward. He was a U.S. Senator from
Minnesota, Eugene McCarthy. Thus, the beginning of
the 'Children's Crusade' began and its eventual success
changed American politics dramatically.
In February 1968, the Tet Offensive caught not only
the White House and the Pentagon off-guard, but the
American public saw for themselves that the war was
perhaps an exercise in futility. Vietnam, it seemed, was
going to take an even larger commitment to succeed.
America, for the first time, began to support negotiations, or some type of downsizing of U.S. forces
in Southeast Asia. 77 This reality was made clear to the
White House when President Johnson barely defeated
Minnesota U.S. Senator Eugene McCarthy in the New
Hampshire Democratic Primary. The outcome shook
the White House and the Democratic Party to its
respective foundations. 78 A few days after the primary,
New York U.S. Senator Robert F. Kennedy entered the
electoral fray. There was blood in the political waters,
and LBJ knew that his days were numbered.
7he New York Times printed an article, "Kennan
Attacks Vietnam Policy As Massive, Unparalleled

Error," that reflected George Kennan's
continuing anger with U.S. policy in
Vietnam. The article also mirrored
the discontentment of millions of
Americans who believed the war was
a mistake, that it represented a commitment they were no longer willing
to make. Nevertheless, it was time for
a new game plan, and Kennan's words
were now finding a larger audience.
He described LBJ's policy as a "massive miscalculation and error of policy,
an error for which it is hard to find
any parallels in our history."79 Kennan
went on to say that the war was:
Grievously unsound, devoid
throughout of a plausible, coherent and realistic object ...... .It is
clear what most Americans have
known for many months: We
cannot wage war in Vietnam
and at the same time alleviate
the hopelessness that leads to
riots. 80
On the day that the article was
published, Kennan made supportive
remarks on behalf of U.S. Senator
Eugene McCarthy at the Military
Park Hotel in Newark, New Jersey.
He spoke, with his usual eloquence,
of his reasons for his public support
of this underdog candidate. Kennan
stated that McCarthy represented
for millions of voters and, perhaps,
America as a whole, "a distinguished
American, a man of long and deep
political experience, a man who by
the courage and consistency of his
conduct and by his readiness to
place the public interest ahead of
personal ambition or advantage." 81
Professor Kennan believed that if
McCarthy did well at the polls this
would awaken the other presidential
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candidates to the fact that the war
could not continue with America
deeply split. 82
In June 1968, Kennan accepted an
invitation to address the organization
called Colonial Williamsburg at the
Hall of the House of Burgesses at the
Capitol in Williamsburg, Virginia. It
was the kind of high profile event at
which Kennan could enunciate his
beliefs about America and Vietnam
and know that his comments would
reach a large segment of the American public. By this time, Kennan had
escaped his earlier caution in his
criticisms of U.S. domestic and foreign policies. His address, ''America
After Vietnam," declared that it was
time for a fundamental change of
U.S. policies, domestically and internationally. Thus, if our nation's leaders
did not recognize these dangerous
developments the country might
come apart.
Kennan did not want to talk
about Vietnam specifically, but the
topic could not be ignored since his
domestic analysis was directly tied to
U.S. activities in Southeast Asia. He
expressed incredulity at the government's continued effort in a part of the
world that did not represent a military
threat or possess any vital interests for
our national interests. Kennan was
not optimistic about how effective
negotiations might be in our pursuit
to disengage from this dreadful situation. He believed that the quicker we
could "liquidate" ourselves from this
conflict the sooner policies could be
created to heal the nation. 83
Kennan felt that our involvement
in Southeast Asia had cost America
an immeasurable amount of prestige
and respect in the world. The U.S.

had put itself in a vulnerable position within the
global community. Our friends and foes would see us
as warmongers, or as weak and undependable in the
fight against communism. He believed it was time for a
benign detachment globally, to re-evaluate our policies
and purposes so that another Vietnam will not occur
again. The process, to say the least, would be painful
and full of lessons for future generations. It was time
to rebuild America. This commitment to rectifY the
problems at home would, in the end, strengthen our
reputation overseas. In short, a new effort was needed
at home without which our foreign influence would
continue to suffer. 84 Kennan, I believe, saw our failure
in Vietnam as a direct reflection of our failures at
home. The post-Vietnam period would entail a major
commitment of America's energies to right the ship of
state at home.
In September 1968, Kennan was quoted by PulitzerPrize winner and journalist, Felix Morley, in an article,
"Trends: The State of the Nation," that:
Our problems are of enormous profundity ... A
nation in such a state of internal disarray ... (We)
cannot afford the luxury of extravagant excursions,
whether of altruism or of military adventure, into
the world beyond its borders; it has no choice but
to prune its external involvements to the bone. 85
In a few weeks, Republican presidential candidate,
former Vice-President Richard Nixon, defeated the
Democratic nominee, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, in a close election. Nixon told supporters that
he had a "secret plan'' for ending the war in Vietnam.
Unfortunately, Kennan's prescient instincts, in 1968,
were quite correct concerning America's self-defeating
negotiating methodology concerning its disengagement
from its quagmire in Southeast Asia. The war, for the
U.S., did not officially end until January 1973. The
human casualties were significant (58,000 U.S. dead and
304,000 wounded). Over (2) million Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians died, and millions of others were
wounded. Valuable national treasury, international good
will, and respect were spent in vain by the U.S. IndoChina suffered grievously as well; they would spend the
next generation rebuilding a shattered region.
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1968 represented a turning point for the U.S. in
terms of popular support for the Vietnam War. Unlike
many public officials, who later wrote post-mortem
apologies or rationalizations for their lack of courage
to stand up to LBJ and his war policies, Kennan did
not suffer from guilt-ridden self-revisionism. He was
correct in his analysis concerning U.S. involvement in
Southeast Asia from the very beginning. Yet, Kennan
never gloated, or tried to benefit professionally from his
stance.The Vietnam War represented an extraordinarily
painful lesson for America. For Kennan, the ideas and
principles represented by America, not the promotion of
self or the aggrandizement of his reputation, remained
paramount in his professional life. Perhaps it was these
factors that separated Kennan from the well-meaning,
though, at times, misguided student protestors, and the
ego-driven political and military leaders in Washington
during the 1960s. George F. Kennan was right about
Vietnam, but he took no joy from his vindication.

Part IV: Postscript = Post-Vietnam/Kennan
observations
In 1975, The New York Review ofBooks had an ensemble
of writers speak on the "The Meaning ofVietnam." One
of the contributors was George F. Kennan. He stated
that the primary lesson to be learned from our involvement in Vietnam is not to be "hypnotized by the word
'communism' and not to mess into other people's civil
wars where there is no substantial American strategic
interest at stake." 86
Kennan goes on to say that the U.S. must re-adjust its
perception of Russia and China as international powers,
and not as bulwarks of monolithic communism. Destablization of the international balance-of-power, the
proliferation of nuclear missiles, nuclear war and the
abuse of the environment are the much bigger challenges for the U.S. in the immediate future. 87
Kennan finds that a curtailment of U.S. commitments overseas is in order, especially in the Third World.
Providing these countries with arms and then sending
in U.S. forces to be confronted by its own military
hardware borders upon lunacy. 88
Charles Neu, author of After Vietnam: Legacies of a
Lost T#Jr, writes that Kennan spotlighted a profound
dilemma confronting the American people in con-
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nection to the Vietnam War. Neu
notes that Kennan, in 1977, asked his
fellow citizens, "whether the great
miscalculations which led us into the
folly of Vietnam were not something
more than just the shortsightedness
of a few individuals-whether they
did not in fact reflect a certain unfitness of the system as a whole for the
conceiving and executing of ambitious
political-military ventures far from
our own shores."89 1his was certainly
a difficult observation because of
Kennan's own relationship within this
particular system. He never separated
himself from this process during the
Vietnam debacle, but Kennan did
eventually become a critical voice
within this foreign policy apparatus.
This result occurred because he was
deeply respected by both sides of the
Vietnam argument, and he didn't
attempt to make any one the villain.
John Lewis Gaddis gave a speech
titled, "What History Teaches About
Grand Strategy," at the National
Defense University symposium.
Gaddis pointed to the fact that
Kennan, in typically blunt manner,
stated that sometimes there is more
wisdom in knowing when to fold a
bad policy. Kennan displayed a stubborn courage when he spoke against
NATO expansion after the demise of
the Cold War, and with the same lucid
and cold-eye analysis that he applied
to Vietnam. Kennan gave a solid and
rational counter-argument to those
who said American credibility would
be damaged by the withdrawal of
U.S. forces. He testified, to the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in 1966, "There is more respect to be
won in the opinion of this world by a
resolute and courageous liquidation of

unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of
extravagant and uncompromising objectives."90
Colonel David Hackworth, the most decorated
living U.S. military figure and prominent Vietnam veteran, defined the integrity and visionary gifts of George
F. Kennan, in contrast to Henry Kissinger. Kissinger
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for helping to end
the Vietnam War. However, many critics believe Kissinger was undeserving of this honor due to his amoral
diplomacy. Hackworth writes that Kennan was "deadon regarding the insanity of America's involvement in
Vietnam. Unlike Kissinger, he doesn't have a butler to
walk behind him picking up his dog droppings. He
(Kennan) lives modestly and has never sold advice to
anyone. In a word, he's a straight-shooter without any
hidden agendas." 91
Yes, a straight-shooter, but a pained one. America
suffered greatly from the Vietnam debacle, and this
reluctant heretic, in the end, stood his ground and found
himself on the right side of history.
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